We, the members of G25, welcome the coming into force of the Parliamentary Service Act 2025 (PSA).
This is a long-overdue reform intended to restore Parliament’s administrative autonomy and strengthen its independence as a fundamental institution of Malaysia’s constitutional democracy.
More than three decades after the repeal of the original Parliamentary Services Act in 1992, the restoration of a dedicated parliamentary service is a welcome step towards an independent parliament.
Section 2(1) of the PSA establishes that the parliamentary service is separate from the public service.
Section 4 empowers a Parliamentary Service Council to appoint members, determine their terms of appointment and oversee financial matters.
Section 3(2)(f) of the PSA also provides for representation from both government and opposition MPs.
However, despite these improvements, we remain disappointed that the calls G25 and other civil societies and experts made in 2025 seem to have fallen on deaf ears.
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While the prime minister has stated that the implementation of the PSA reflects the government’s commitment to institutional reforms, we find that several provisions in the PSA remain weak, making it fall short of genuine reform and independence.
We are disappointed that section 11(1) of the PSA has not been improved despite our criticisms and still requires the chief administrator of Parliament to be appointed from among members of the general public service of the federation.
This risks perpetuating the very administrative dependence that a separate parliamentary service is intended to overcome.
Under sections 11(2) and 11(3), the chief administrator is responsible for Parliament’s overall administration and day-to-day affairs, including the financial matters of the parliamentary service, and exercises general control over its members.
To maintain neutrality, the chief administrator should be selected from within Parliament’s independent service and not the general public service. This would help ensure that the position is filled on the basis of institutional expertise rather than external political considerations.
Furthermore, appointing the chief administrator from outside the parliamentary service leaves parliamentary officers’ career pathways to the highest administrative position within their institution uncertain.
Funding provisions in the PSA also remain ambiguous. Although section 4(1)(b) empowers the Parliamentary Service Council to oversee financial matters, section 12 merely requires the government to provide sufficient annual funding for the council to perform its functions.
While this recognises the need for parliamentary funding, it does not specify how the budget is to be determined, how Parliament’s budgetary requirements are to be independently assessed, or how disputes over funding adequacy are to be resolved.
The PSA does not establish a parliamentary budget office or prescribe a clear, independent budget process.
Such safeguards are necessary to secure Parliament’s financial autonomy and reduce its dependence on the executive.
The PSA also does not adequately balance confidentiality with public accountability.
Section 14(1) PSA prohibits members of the council and parliamentary service, as well as those attending council meetings or accessing relevant information, from disclosing information obtained through their duties, subject to specified exceptions.
While legitimate confidentiality is necessary, the provision is broad and does not clearly distinguish sensitive information from routine administrative decisions, governance matters and financial information that should be open to public scrutiny.
While section 5(7) requires the council to maintain minutes of its meetings, it does not require their publication.
Sections 10 and 14 also do not establish a comprehensive public reporting mechanism, dedicated parliamentary oversight of the council’s operations, or even a requirement for an annual report.
As we have mentioned before, clear public reporting mechanisms are necessary to allow accessibility to parliamentary decisions and operations because, if Parliament is to serve as the highest institution of public representation, it must remain open and accountable to the people.
Beyond those sections, the PSA’s institutional framework is also insufficiently defined.
Section 2(2) states that the parliamentary service consists of the clerks to the Senate and the House of Representatives, together with members of the parliamentary service. But it does not clearly define the categories of officers and other staff to be covered. This leaves the scope of the service uncertain.
Although section 3 specifies the council’s membership, the inclusion of the Treasury secretary general or a representative, the public service director general or a representative, and the chief administrator as ex-officio members raises questions about the extent to which the council can operate independently of the public service and executive administration.
While section 4 sets out the council’s functions, the PSA does not establish a comprehensive framework for independent oversight of the council’s decisions and operations or for reporting its performance to Parliament and the public.
These gaps weaken the safeguards needed to ensure that the parliamentary service and the council operate independently, effectively and accountably.
We, G25, recognise the progress represented by a separate parliamentary service, the establishment of the Parliamentary Service Council, and the provision for opposition representation.
However, parliamentary independence requires more than structural changes, It demands genuine control over its administration, finances and personnel, and meaningful public accountability.
A strong Parliament is not merely a place where laws are passed. It is where the executive is held to account, public expenditure is scrutinised and the people’s voices are represented.
We therefore call on the ‘Madani’ (civil) government to demonstrate that its commitment to institutional reform extends beyond the passage of legislation.
Let this be but a stepping stone to address these shortcomings and ensure that Parliament can discharge its constitutional responsibilities with effective checks and balances on the executive, free from undue political, administrative and financial influence.
Until these safeguards are in place, parliamentary independence remains incomplete. – G25
The views expressed in Aliran's media statements and the NGO statements we have endorsed reflect Aliran's official stand. Views and opinions expressed in other pieces published here do not necessarily reflect Aliran's official position.
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