In a pre-election report, our Sarawak correspondent PHILIP JAMES, reflects on some of the issues underlying the delayed Sarawak election, now likely to take place in the second half of September after the first ever celebrations of Malaysia Day in Sibu

The outcome of the coming Sarawak state election is in little doubt. The state Barisan Nasional will win at least two-thirds of the seats; indeed, it might even make a clean sweep of them.

What is in doubt, however, is the performance of the state BN in terms of popular votes. If the opposition collectively takes close to 40% of the popular vote, it would be cause for much celebration and breast-beating.

Thus, the election will be carefully watched, not least by the Barisan Nasional (BN) itself. For the BN, despite a brave front, has quietly admitted that there are numerous uncertainties in the coming election. Some reports suggest that BN has gone so far as to rate one-third of the constituencies as �grey areas�! This is highly unlikely and probably represents an attempt to lull their opponents.

It will be watched for signs of a translation of passive dissension into active voting or a shift in voter sentiment. It will also be a test of the opposition's ability to capitalise on local issues and local resonances of national issues to garner a substantial proportion of the votes and even a few seats.

It will, if former federal minister and Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB) deputy president Abang Abu Bakar�s so-called independent slate of candidates is to be believed, also be closely watched by UMNO for clues as to whether it should make the move into Sarawak.

Not least, it will be monitored by various factions of PBB, the leading component of the state BN, and of Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak (PBDS) for signs of a slackening of the grip of PBB President Taib Mahmud, chief minister for the past 21 years, and hence the possibility of an overt challenge to him.

Should the Taib-led BN lose more than two seats in Malay majority constituencies, it will be seen as the beginning of the end of Taib�s seemingly unassailable position. Should it lose five seats or more, it will likely seal his fate.

Taib's Uncertainty

Added to the above has been the uncertainty over Chief Minister Taib Mahmud�s own constituency of Asajaya. This arose out of his performance in the 1999 general election in the parliamentary constituency of Samarahan which comprises the state constituencies of Asajaya and Muara Tuang. While he won handily in Muara Tuang, his performance in Asajaya was somewhat lack-lustre.

Few doubt that he will probably win if he were to defend Asajaya, because of the array of inducements available to him; but, there is nevertheless a risk. Abang Abu Bakar, who has declared his intention to challenge Taib in Asajaya, poses a credible challenge in a constituency where much development has also led to significant dissatisfaction, not to mention a huge block of postal voters considerably influenced by political developments in the peninsula.

This personal risk to Taib has now been resolved with his re-location to the Melanau-majority seat of Balingian. Coupled with widespread gossip that state minister and current PBB deputy president Abang Johari may be re-located to Asajaya, this shuffle may yet turn out to be a master stroke by which Taib achieves several objectives: (a) secure a very comfortable, probably uncontested, win; (b) deal a blow to Abang Abu Bakar, the enemy without, and to Abang Johari, the perceived enemy within, and (c) potentially throw Malay politics in the Kuching area, the heart of Malay dissatisfaction with Taib, off-balance.

One of the consequences of the extended speculation over Taib�s re-location to another seat is worth mentioning as illustrative of the character of the present regime. Many months ago, an article appeared in the Utusan Sarawak on this matter. It was actually laudatory of Taib, asserting that he really had nothing to fear in Asajaya. Yet, because it was printed without permission from on high, the journalist and the editor responsible for the appearance of the piece were removed within 24 hours!

Anyway, these various uncertainties, some now partly resolved, have delayed the election. There have been at least a couple of aborted attempts earlier this year, but it is now almost certain that the election will be called very shortly after the culmination of this year�s Merdeka celebrations in Sibu on 16 September, the first time that Merdeka celebrations will extend to the actual Malaysia Day. The clearest sign: all civil service leave has now been frozen.

Matters That Rankle

What are the sources of these uncertainties, given that Sarawak is not the Peninsula � an obvious enough fact?

Not so obvious, however, is that Sarawak has been infected by the climate of dissent that has enveloped the country if not to the same degree as the Peninsula.

Equally, Sarawak is feeling the consequences of the break-neck pace of growth of the 1990s, many of which now come home to roost in a number of ways.

Added to this are some issues of the Sarawak BN government�s own making, indeed of the Chief Minister�s own making within PBB.

Let us look at these three inter-related matters.

Sarawakians are very state nationalist and state-centric, usually perceiving matters in the Peninsula as somewhat distant and of secondary concern.

Yet, the widespread outpouring of dissatisfaction with the federal government and the national BN has its resonances and parallels in Sarawak. The charges of corruption, cronyism and nepotism, the lack of transparency and accountability, the abuse of power, the sense of unfreedom and the length of time the leader has been in office, more arrogant by the year � all these have uncomfortably close parallels in Sarawak.

True or not, popular opinion has long held that corruption, cronyism and nepotism are a way of life in Sarawak, that transparency is something that applies to the material used for overhead projectors or the glass ladder in the new state library, and that one speaks one�s mind at great personal risk. All this is best encapsulated by a widespread gloss on the acronym of a major Sarawak KLSE-listed company, Cahaya Mata Sarawak (CMS), as Chief Minister & Sons, and the stories that abound of alleged self-aggrandisement on the part of those entrusted as leaders, from the top to the bottom levels of society.

Nevertheless, these matters are, in themselves, unlikely to make much of an impact on the Sarawak election. There is a widespread sense of an absence of an alternative, hence the hope � incomprehensible in the current Peninsular context � in some quarters of bringing UMNO to Sarawak as a check on the local parties and, in particular, of the current chief minister. There is a widespread cynicism and an acceptance that politics is corrupt; hence that elections are that once-in-five-years festival when ordinary people get to share in that corruption. Finally, there is a widespread sense that one cannot afford not to undi perintah (vote for the ruling party), as it would otherwise mean being cut off from badly needed infrastructure development and minor projects.

Against such a backdrop, even sympathy for Anwar Ibrahim�s plight � and there�s actually quite a bit of sympathy � can be turned into fear: fear of the consequences should one align with the opposition, a fear that serves as an ironic validation of the sentiment voiced by Anwar Ibrahim when he said, �If this can happen to the No. 2 man in the country...�

Thus, a broad sense of malaise can hardly be expected to translate into active votes for the opposition. It would need more pressing and immediate local issues to do so and it would need local voices and candidates of sufficient standing and credibility to articulate them.

That was the case when Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak (PBDS) was in opposition and able to galvanise a broad spectrum of Dayak, particularly Iban, opinion into action and votes between 1987 and 1994; even then, they found it difficult to translate those votes into seats.

It was the case in the impossibly vast but sparsely populated constituency of Telang Usan in 1996, when a former PBB notable, standing as an independent, defeated his PBB opponent because of the latter�s well-known defects which offended local sensibility.

So also was it the case in the other impossibly vast and sparsely populated constituency of Belaga, location of the Bakun Dam, where, in 1996, the PBDS candidate, standing under the BN banner, won with less than half the votes against a slate of four other candidates, reflecting the widespread but inchoate sense of unhappiness with the developments of that time.

So, are there pressing and immediate local issues this time around? The brief answer is �yes�. The full answer is a bit more complex.

The break-neck pace of growth and the sources of that growth have had contradictory consequences, generating at the same time much wealth and income, and a sense of disenfranchisement and loss as relative, and perceived, income inequality and material standard of life have widened between urban and rural and between rich and poor. This has intersected with goverment policy as well as some self-inflicted wounds in the manner of government implementation of policy.

Perhaps paradoxically for outsiders, given the widespread publicity it generated at its height, it is the relative decline of the timber, more specifically logging, industry that has had most impact on this score. Perhaps even more paradoxically, it has also been the return of the PBDS to the BN fold that has been at the heart of policies and implementation that have resulted in widespread consternation.

Land

Take the latter first. The return of the PBDS to the BN fold in the mid-1990s enabled the revival of land development policies for native customary rights (NCR) land.

Originally mooted in the mid-1980s, the idea had been shelved for fear that it would provide PBDS with a major rallying point, given the centrality of land and land rights to native society.

On its revival, the policy, billed as a new concept of NCR land development, took the form of private sector, rather than state-sponsored, land development. NCR land was to be leased for a 60-year term to a joint-venture private company in which the land owners would have a 30% interest, acquired with 60% of ex gratia payments for the land; this entitled them to 30% of the dividends, when declared. This is a far cry from the admittedly poorly managed state-sponsored land development schemes in which land owners retain full interest in their land and enjoy the full proceeds, less costs, similar to a FELDA or FELCRA development.

More immediately, besides concerns over sufficiency of land left over for their own activities, many natives balked at the idea of a 60-year lease on land that was not individually titled; they feared that it would eventually result in outright loss of land as current lessors were unlikely to survive the duration of the lease. These fears were further heightened by last year�s amendments to the land code which, while promising titling of native customary land, also suggested the possibility of a significant contraction of the area falling under the category of such land � the culmination of more than a century of conflict between state/government and native views of land and land rights, with the former attempting to progressively restrict the coverage to land under actual cultivation, and the latter insisting on retaining rights to a territory including forest and rivers.

These amendments to the land code were the proximate cause of a conflict within the PBDS, leading to the challenge of a faction led by former PBDS deputy president, Daniel Tajem, who was appointed High Commissioner to New Zealand when PBDS re-joined the BN. The challenge resulted in the latter�s election as PBDS deputy president, in a contest with James Masing. It was a bruising contest in which the main issue was the alleged failure of James Masing to represent Dayak interests with respect to the land code amendments.

Thus, land and the fate of native rights to land is a major local issue with deep resonance across the state. Natives received a major boost for their stand on land rights when the High Court of Borneo delivered a landmark decision this year affirming their view of the matter. This was a case which pitted some natives against Borneo Pulp and Paper (BPP), a private company with significant state interests, and the Government of Sarawak. The State Attorney-General�s office attempted to deny that native customary rights pre-dated state legislation. BPP had been awarded a land lease over an area which natives insisted included their customary land. This lease covers half the district of Tatau and, if fully realised, will extend over some half a million hectares, considerably larger than the currently gazetted totally protected area.

At the same time, five natives are defending themselves against charges carrying mandatory death sentences. The case arose out of a fatal land dispute between their longhouse and Sarawak Oil Palm, a joint-venture between Shinyang, a predominantly timber concern, and the state government.

On top of this, current resettlement practice, as in the cases of the Bakun Dam and Borneo Pulp and Paper, is to provide only 3 acres (1.25 ha) of farmland per household. It is generally agreed that such a farm size cannot provide a decent standard of living and will condemn these households to poverty, unless they are able to obtain other employment.

In certain contexts, the land issue takes a different cast. For example, in and around the Kuching area, there are many who have long resided on land technically owned by the state. Several of these areas, mostly Malay, were ear-marked for re-development, with the residents to be resettled in low-cost housing projects elsewhere. In Sarawak, urban low-cost housing is priced at RM40,000, while other house prices which were extremely stable for a long time have sky-rocketed in the 1990s outstripping income growth. The proposed resettlement generated much resistance which, together with other matters, resulted in several close calls in the 1999 general election. As a result, the government has started issuing titles, and this will definitely be used as a means of inducement in the coming state election.

At the same time, those with information have bought up land in the path of urban expansion, or in areas slated for development, before such information becomes generally known. Many are politicians or perceived as those with the right connections. The value of such land has sky-rocketed shortly after purchase. This has been one of the issues in the Samarahan area where land, purchased for as little as RM5,000 an acre is now worth RM200,000.

Jobs

The relative decline of timber has meant a constriction of relatively well-paying jobs for people with little education. There has been and continues to be unhappiness, sometimes spilling over into direct action, over logging. But the ability of the logging industry to provide largesse to local leaders and relatively well-paying employment to others, as well as the opening up of logging roads thus making transport cheaper, underlies the deep ambiguity of Dayaks to it.

Downstream processing, much of it now facing intense price competition, has never paid as well. Indeed, rates of pay at around RM12 a day, even less, mean poverty rates for local people. Thus, it is no surprise that some 70% of the labour force in the timber processing industry in, for example, Bintulu is Indonesian. Employment in other factory work is also low-paying.

Plantations also mean poorly paid employment, suitable only as additional employment and not as a main income source. Thus, again, the presence of much foreign labour.

The reluctance of locals to engage in such low-paying work is then attributed to their �laziness�, their resistance to having their land incorporated into estates to their �bad attitudes�.

Self-inflicted Wounds of Autocracy

Finally, the self-inflicted wounds resulting from the autocratic character of the chief minister.

The main festering wound resulted from the contest for one of the deputy presidencies of PBB in 1997. Abang Johari, from an old established Malay family in Kuching, and then Minister of Industrial Development, stood for the seat, with support from Malays and Dayaks, and out-going deputy president Abang Abu Bakar. Although he sought and obtained permission from President and Chief Minister Taib, it was an open secret that the latter favoured another, Adenan Satem. In the event, Abang Johari handily defeated Adenan Satem, at which point, a senior vice president post was created and the latter appointed to it.

Persons associated with Abang Johari or seen as having had a hand in his victory were black-listed, their businesses discriminated against. Abang Johari himself was moved from industrial development to tourism, seen as a more junior post. Even long-standing Dayak loyalists such as Leonard Linggi and Celestine Ujang were sidelined.

The main consequence of this has been to further sharpen long-standing Malay dissatisfaction, particularly in Kuching, with the present leadership. Circumscribed in their ability, and courage, to challenge the present leadership, some look to UMNO as a possible instrument to press that challenge.

Ironically, in the re-delineation exercise prior to the 1996 election, assumptions of voter loyalty and disloyalty resulted in a re-delineation that created a greater number of Malay majority seats. It also led to a constituency size voter ratios that cannot be justified by considerations of rural weightage or physical size of the constituency. For example, in Kuching, Padungan has twice the number of voters of Satok; Satok is just 3 km from Padungan!

Thus, as in the Peninsula, the chickens have apparently come home to roost.

"Developmentalist" Card

It is these inter-twining strands of discontent that will determine voter behaviour in the coming state election, over and above whatever influence the splashing around of money and material inducements will have.

Together, these multiple strands have created enough uncertainty that, sources say, has resulted in stymying the ability of the official intelligence apparatus to read the leanings of voters. Hence the delay in holding this election until virtually the last possible moment, this side of the law.

Yet, the ruling party has one extremely strong card to play. That card is the ideology of �developmentalism�, the role of government in that and the need to be on the side of government, or rather the incumbent ruling party, to have access to such development. This is a complex issue, but briefly it is one that has successfully been used to disempower the people, thus turning elections into an instrument of domination, rather than one which the people use to effect their will.

Until and unless this ideology of �developmentalism� is broken, it will remain the case that despite all the grievances, the majority of the electorate will continue to undi perintah, the only ruling party they have ever known and one which has so successfully blurred the lines between party and government.

The Seats To Watch Out For

My call is to watch out for the Malay majority seats in and around Kuching and in the Sri Aman-Sibu area; but even then, I would watch the popular votes, although a few seats may well be won by the opposition, if they have the right candidates.

Limbang and Pelagus will also be well-worth watching for, in addition to the panoply of issues above, these two seats will see fathers attempting to give their sons a leg-up. In Limbang, long-standing SNAP President James Wong is seeking to propel his son, Richard, into public office, against the wishes of local BN component parties; in Pelagus, PBDS financier, incumbent S�ng Chee Hua, is seeking to get his son, 22-year old Larry, elected, also against much local rumbling.

Elsewhere, keep an eye on the popular vote, although the Chinese majority seats, with the possible exception of Padungan (in Kuching), are likely to go with the Sarawak United Peoples Party (SUPP).