Greg Lopez reviews Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian’s book ‘Palace, Political Party and Power: A Story of the Socio-Political Development of Malay Kingship’.
Singapore: NUS Press, 2011. Pp. xxiv, 472; map, tables, figures, photographs, list of abbreviations and acronyms, glossary, notes, bibliography, index.
On 6 February 2009, approximately 3000 Malays protested in the royal town of Kuala Kangsar, demanding that the Perak ruler, Sultan Azlan Shah, dismiss the state’s legislative assembly to pave the way for new state elections.
Earlier, Malaysia’s then Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak’s BN coalition had extra-constitutionally toppled the popularly elected Pakatan Rakyat state government with the complicity of Perak’s royals. Never in Malaysian history had there been such a popular uprising against Malay royals as the ensuing protests. A video on Youtube www.youtube.com/watch?v=QJf9ZBpBe1U provides a hint of the likelihood that in a new Malaysia the most significant threat to the Malay rulers’ fetish for power will come not from the United Malays National Organisation (Umno) but from ordinary Malays.
Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian serves as professor of history and senior fellow in the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities of the Universiti Pendidikan Sultan Idris. She ranks among the most renowned and respected historians of modern Thailand. The latest of her many books, Palace, Political Party and Power: A story of the Socio-Political Development of Malay Kingship, sees her turn her attention to the history of modern Malaysia to provide a cogent analysis of the relationship between Umno and the Malay rulers in their common quest for power. The book’s timing is opportune, as it comes at a moment at which each of these institutions, Umno and Malay kingship, confronts a decline in its legitimacy within a seriously divided Malay community.
Palace, Political Party and Power represents a valuable addition to the literature not only on the relationship between the Malay rulers and Umno, but also on that between the Malay rulers and UMNO on the one hand and their “subjects” – the Malays of Peninsular Malaysia – on the other. Even more significantly, it treats an important and neglected dimension of Malaysian politics – the impact of the Malay rulers on the country’s affairs.
The Japanese Occupation
Palace, Political Party and Power traces the socio-political development of the institution of Malay rulership, from the beginning of colonial times, when the Malay rulers lost power but not prestige; through the Japanese Occupation, when they lost both; to the restoration of the rulers’ prestige – thanks to the new Malay elites – at independence; and in the ebbs and flows since.
In narrating this story, the book achieves three principal ends. First, it reaffirms conventional analysis holding that the British residential system in colonial Malaya had great significance in modernising the institution of Malay rulership towards the constitutional monarchy of today’s Malaysia.
Second, it argues persuasively that it was the Japanese Occupation of Malaya that provided the platform for new Malay elites – whose members would become the leading lights of Umno – to take the leadership of the Malay masses away from the Malay rulers but in the process also to restore the prestige of those rulers.
Third, and most important, almost seventy per cent of Palace, Political Party and Power focuses on the complex relationship – one of competition for and cooperation in power – between the country’s two leading Malay institutions, Umno and the rulers.
Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian’s central argument is that the Japanese Occupation of Malaya and Japanese policies towards the Malay rulers, the new Malay elites, and the Malay community had, more than any other factor, the effect of stripping the Malay royal institution of its “aura”, “mystique”, “grandeur” and “authority.” In consequence, Malay rulership no longer commanded the fear or undisputed reverence of members of the post-1945 Malay elite.
Malaya’s Japanese occupiers, through their treatment of the Malay rulers, revealed those rulers’ impotence, their inability to defend themselves, and also their lack of the capacity to defend the interests of their subjects – the rakyat. This reality made clear to the burgeoning new Malay elite, which the Japanese also developed, that the existence of Malay royal institutions depended very much on the goodwill of those in power. It provided that new elite with a valuable lesson for dealing with difficult members of the royalty during the post-1945 period.
Furthermore, Palace, Political Party and Power argues, Japan’s policy of inculcating Malay society with a certain variant of Japanese values through education had the unintended effect of strengthening the Malays as one community, sharing one language and one religion. Many Malay youths were sent to schools – ordinary schools, teacher training schools, and leadership schools (kurenjo). In the leadership schools, Malay students were taught by means of an exhausting daily routine to appreciate and to live by Nippon seishin, or the Japanese spirit.
This exposure to Japanese values had the profound effect of changing some Malays’ outlook on life, and above all of exorcising the narrow socio-political parochialism that had previously divided the Malays into subjects of different rulers owing allegiance to different sultanates. The Japanese Occupation of Malaya also toughened members of the new Malay elite, as both the British and the Malay rulers would learn so dramatically after Imperial Japan’s defeat.
Palace, Political Party and Power develops its arguments over nine chapters, in essence covering two periods: that before the establishment of Umno in 1946 and that after the party’s establishment.
The first chapter provides a brief introduction to the concept of monarchy and locates the Malay rulers within the history and among the fortunes of monarchs in post-colonial developing nations. While many monarchs lost their titles, the monarchs of the newly minted Federated States of Malaya gained a new title in 1957. With the addition of the elected Supreme Head of State or Yang DiPertuan Agung to the nine existing rulers of Malay states, Malaya became the country with the greatest number of constitutional rulers in the world, ten in all.
The second and the third chapters of Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian’s book discuss the abject state of the Malay rulers as of the middle of the last century. They narrate the story of the social-political decline that the rulers suffered first under British colonial rule and then under the Japanese Occupation.
Chapters Four through Eight discuss the tug of war between the Malay rulers and Umno to define the de facto and de jure roles of constitutional monarchs in independent Malaya/Malaysia, and Chapter Nine concludes the book.
In its research, Palace, Political Party and Power is all that one would expect from Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian. She has scoured archives and other holdings at the Public Records Office and the library of the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, the Rhodes House library at Oxford, and the National Library of Singapore and the library of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), as well as archival holdings in Malaysia itself.
‘Boxing match’ of four rounds
She demonstrates real courage in writing about Malay monarchy and Umno in a true academic fashion; she proves herself objective in the context of a public university in Malaysia. Unlike the general brood of academicians that fill Malaysia’s public university system, Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian is no Umno or royalist sycophant.
Palace, Political Party and Power suggests that, if the contest between Umno and the Malay rulers were a boxing match, then Umno would be leading after four rounds but facing uncertainty in the remaining rounds and the serious possibility of losing the bout. For Umno’s legitimacy as the protector of the Malays is declining faster than that of the Malay rulers.
We may divide the contest between Umno and the Malay rulers up to now into four clear chronological rounds. Round One, circa 1946, centred on the issue of Malayan Union. It was a draw, as the Malay rulers, Umno and Malay subjects rallied together in the common cause of protecting the rights of the rulers.
Round Two, roughly 1948–1951, was focused on the powers of the new Malay elite, represented by Umno. Throttling the ascendancy of Umno, the monarchs clearly won that round.
Round Three was the 1951–1955 Merdeka negotiations, and it went to Umno.
And Round Four brought Umno victory in 1983/84 and 1993/94. It left Umno the supreme power in the land. This bout’s fifth round is currently being fought. There is no clear winner yet, but the Malay rulers have come back very strong.
In discussing the factors that explain the success of the constitutional relationship between the Malay rulers and the executive leadership of the country, Palace, Political Party and Power suggests three: the strong political power of the chief executive, the personal prestige of the chief executive vis-à-vis the rulers, and personal attributes of the men who have occupied these positions. Adding to these three factors was of course the legitimacy of the Malay rulers and Umno’s leaders, respectively, in the eyes of the rakyat.
At a theoretical level, this book frames the analyses of the relationship between the Malay rulers and Umno as a contest between two ideas of constitutional monarchy. These two ideas are best captured in quotations from Tunku Abdul Rahman and Sultan Azlan Shah that appear in Palace, Political Party and Power:
The Constitution implies without room for contradiction that though the Sultans are sovereign heads of states, they have no power to rule. The power lies in the hands of the people who through their representatives run the government of the nation and the states…
Tunku Abdul Rahman, page 408
What the Agung can do and what he cannot do is clearly defined by the Constitution. One fact is certain, the royal prerogative is exercised by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, as representing the electorate, hence the people have a lot to say…It can be assumed that while the Rulers enjoy their rights and privileges, they must live within these rights…The Menteri Besar and the State Executive Councillors are supposed to be the ‘watchdogs’…Their duties are to see the Rulers do not commit excess…
Tunku Abdul Rahman, page 330
A King is a King, whether he is an absolute or constitutional monarch. The only difference between the two is that whereas one has unlimited powers, the other’s powers are defined by the Constitution. But it is a mistake to think that the role of the King, like that of a President, is confined to what is laid down by the Constitution. His role far exceeds those constitutional provisions.
Sultan Azlan Shah, page 330
Southeast Asian model
Another example of the way in which Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian frames her analysis is the comparison of Westminster-style constitutional monarchy, which emphasises the non-political nature of the monarchy, with the “Southeast Asian” model of constitutional monarchy, best represented by the current Thai king. The Southeast Asian model follows in form the Westminster-type model, whereby the monarch delegates all powers to the people’s representatives. However, in practise, the modern Southeast Asian monarch reserves the ultimate extra-constitutional power to interpret, intervene, reject or direct a course of action in affairs of state.
This line of analysis is, however, very narrow in its usefulness. It misses the central feature of Malaysia’s system of government. Malaysia is a constitutional monarchy only in name. The wording of the country’s constitution has been amended more than 650 times; 42 amendment bills have been passed. In fact, Malaysia is a dysfunctional democracy, in which the ruling Umno enjoys disproportionate power relative to all other institutions.
In the political science literature, Malaysia is conceptualised not as a democracy but as a semi-democracy, neither democratic nor authoritarian, a syncretistic, repressive-responsive and electoral one-party state. In this context, the relationship between Umno and the Malay rulers takes on a different meaning. It is not a contest over interpretation of the constitution so much as one over Umno’s ability to hold hegemonic power.
Furthermore, a Westminster model works best in a non-feudal society, whereas Malaysian society remains feudal. These realities notwithstanding, it would nevertheless be interesting to know if Malay rulers like Sultan Azlan Shah indeed see themselves operating according to Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian’s Southeast Asian model of kingship.
To frame the relationship between Umno and the rulers in terms of a quest for power turns the focus to legitimacy: first, the legitimacy of the actions of Umno and the Malay rulers in the eyes of the rakyat and, second, Umno’s legitimation of its actions through the use and abuse of the Malay rulers as the party made itself Malaysia’s most powerful institution.
In this context, Palace, Political Party and Power overlooks an important event in Malaysian history, one that solidified Umno’s position as the pinnacle organisation in Malaysian society. This event was the 1988 sacking of Malaysia’s Lord President, Tun Salleh Abbas; the subsequent emasculation of the country’s judiciary; and the complicity in these events of the then Agung, Sultan Mahmud Iskandar Shah of Johor.
A more recent example of the power of Umno, one not treated in detail in the book but described in the opening paragraph of this review, was its toppling of a popularly elected state government with the support of the Malay ruler. The book also neglects numerous cases of Umno’s use of the Malay rulers to curtail the civil liberties of Malaysians.
An analytical framework centred on Umno’s quest for ultimate power makes possible also a coherent explanation for the increasingly common appeal of various political organisations and civil society movements to the Malay rulers – namely the Yang DiPertuan Agung – in such causes as free and fair elections, protection of the rights of Indian Malaysian or of Malay language rights, and others.
These appeals have come despite the Malaysian monarchy’s limited de jure and de facto powers and its blemished track record. The reason for them is that, when virtually all other institutions in Malaysia are either weak or Umno proxies or both, only the Malay rulers, with their interest in protecting and furthering their own interests, offer a glimmer of hope against the excess of Malaysia’s true ‘monarchs’ – the Umno-putras.
Palace, Political Party and Power notes that, by the end of 2008, the Malay rulers’ stature was definitely on the rise. That would seem to remain the case as long as Umno’s political leadership continued to be ineffective.
The events of 6 February 2009 showed, however, just how vulnerable the Malay rulers are. Sultan Azlan Shah and the Perak regent Raja Nazrin, heralded in this book as examples of a new breed of monarchs who are competent and have the interest of the rakyat at heart, are now treated as outcasts by a significant number of people in their own state of Perak and by Malaysians in general.
The Malay rulers’ long-term challenge is not besting Umno but rather winning the hearts of Malays, Malays who are increasingly shedding their feudalistic mindset.
Greg Lopez is New Mandala’s Malaysia editor, and a PhD scholar at the Crawford School of Economics and Government of the Australian National University.
Source: New Mandala asiapacific.anu.edu.au